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Abstract. We propose an application that allows users to request other
users for help with every-day tasks. Users can pay each other for these
tasks by issuing contracts in which the requester promises to return the
favor in the future by performing some task for the other. Such contracts
can be seen as an alternative currency, coined by the users themselves.
Trust is an essential aspect of this system, as the issuer of a contract may
fail to fulfill its commitments. Therefore, the application comes with a
social network where users can leave comments about other users. Fur-
thermore, our application includes a market place where users can ex-
change service contracts between each other, and a negotiation algorithm
that can automatically trade these contracts on behalf of the user.
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1 Introduction
Around the world traditional economies are converting more and more into what
is known as a sharing economy: an economical system in which individuals share
goods and services with each other, rather than buying them from official compa-
nies. Well-known examples of applications and communities based around shar-
ing are Couch Surfing,1 Airbnb2 and BlaBlaCar.3 Another important change in
modern economy is the introduction of virtual currencies; currencies that are
not regulated by governments or banks, but by informal communities and that
only exist in digital form. The best known example of such currency is Bitcoin.4
In this paper we propose an extension of the u-Help application introduced
in [2]. U-Help is a distributed community-based application that allows users to
request help with every-day tasks from other community members. A user may
for example request a babysitter for her child. This request is then propagated
along the network so that any other user in the community may accept the
request and voluntarily carry out the requested task. The original u-Help ap-
plication however relies entirely on the willingness of people to help voluntarily.
1 http://www.couchsurfing.org
2 http://www.airbnb.com
3 http://www.blablacar.com/
4 https://bitcoin.org/
This may work in small communities where most people know each other, but it
is less likely to succeed when used in larger communities with more anonymity
because it would be tempting to act as a freerider. In this paper we therefore
propose to extend u-Help with a virtual currency system that enables people to
pay for the help they receive.
2 Alternative Currency
In our extension, when a user receives a request he or she may not only accept or
reject that request, but may also ask for a favor in return. The requesting user
can then pay the accepter by issuing a service contract, in which he promises to
return the favor by helping the accepter with some task in the future.
Example: Bob asks Alice to pick up his child from school. In return Bob gives
Alice a service contract in which he promises Alice to help her repair her com-
puter, some time in the future whenever she needs it.
The users can negotiate on the terms of the contract, similar to a mechanism
introduced in [3] in which agents may promise future rewards when negotiating
a deal in the present. In the example above we say that Bob is the issuer of the
contract. Such a service contract can then be used by Alice in two ways: she can
exercise the contract, meaning that Alice requests Bob to fulfill his commitment
and fix her computer, or she can pass on the contract to somebody else to make
a payment, as if it were a sort of currency.
Example: Alice asks Charles to repair her car. As a payment Alice gives Charles
the contract she earlier received from Bob. So whenever Charles’ computer is
broken, he can go to Bob and exercise the contract.
Note that this system is very similar to the original use of bank notes: they
served as a proof that a bank owed a certain amount of gold to the holder of the
bank note. In our case a service contract is a proof that another user still owes
a certain favor to the holder of the contract.
We make a distinction between a task and a service contract. A task explic-
itly defines an activity that is going to take place at a specified time and place
as a favor for a specific person. A service contract also specifies an activity but
does not specify when, and does not specify who is the beneficiary. Exercising a
service contract means to convert it into a task.
A service contract specifies:
– The type of activity.
– The person who is going to do the activity (the issuer of the contract).
– The duration of the activity.
A task specifies:
– The type of activity.
– The person who is going to do the activity (the issuer of the contract).
– The duration of the activity.
– The date, time and location of the activity.
– The beneficiary.
Of course it can always happen that the holder of a contract wants to exercise
it on a moment inauspicious to the issuer. Therefore, the contract may include
terms on how and when it can be exercised. For example: “Bob will fix your
computer, but you have to request him to do so at least 2 days in advance”.
3 Trust
The notion of trust is essential in this system. After all, Charles and Bob may
not even know each other, so Charles does not know whether Bob is really handy
enough with computers to solve his problem. If Charles does not trust Bob he
will not accept any contract issued by Bob as a payment. Therefore, we propose a
reputation system that helps users to decide whether to accept service contracts
issued by unknown people. This reputation system consists of a database that
stores for every user:
– His or her skills.
– Reviews of this user written by other users and their satisfaction levels for
previous tasks executed by this user.
– A social graph, showing whether two users have common friends.
– His or her number of “outstanding” contracts (contracts that he or she has
issued but that have not been exercised yet).
Every user has a profile where this information can be found. Other users can
leave comments on this profile which cannot be removed. Of course, one should
always consider the possibility that the issuer of a contract will not fulfill his
commitment. In that case one can leave a negative comment on the issuer’s
profile, which will reflect badly on his reputation. This will strongly decrease his
chances of receiving help from others in the future as they will consider contracts
issued by him less valuable. Therefore, users have an incentive not to issue more
contracts than they are actually able to fulfill. Again, this resembles the way
that real monetary systems work: people accept payments in dollars because
they trust that the Federal Reserve will not print dollars excessively and cause
hyperinflation. In our proposed system every single user essentially acts as a
central bank for his or her own currency.
4 Negotiations
When Alice requests Bob to execute some task for her, they need to agree on how
Alice is going to repay this favor. These negotiations can become difficult if, for
example, Alice does not have anything to offer in return that Bob is interested
in. To solve this problem we propose an online market place where users can
exchange service contracts. This market place has several advantages:
1. It enlarges the set of possible deals that can be made between users.
2. It enables users to exchange service contracts they do not need for contracts
they do need.
3. It enables users to “buy back” contracts issued by themselves.
An example of the first case would be when Alice finds a contract on the market
place that Bob is interested in. She can then agree with Bob to “buy” that
contract in exchange for a contract issued by herself, so that she can give that
contract to Bob, and Bob can help Alice with her computer. The second case
applies when Bob has accepted a contract issued by Alice, but is not interested in
exercising it. He can then trade that contract on the market place for another one
that he is interested in. The third case applies if Alice has issued many contracts
which have not yet been exercised, while she herself owns many contracts issued
by others. If she is afraid she will not be able to fulfill all the contracts she issued
she can take them off the market by trading them for the contracts she owns.
If there are thousands of users looking for contracts or offering contracts in
the market place at the same time it may be very difficult to find the right
deal. Therefore, we propose to incorporate an automated negotiating agent into
the application based on the algorithm introduced in [1]. The user can then tell
his agent the kinds of contracts he is looking for, the kinds of contracts he is
willing to issue, and the contracts he currently owns (issued by others). The
agent will then contact the market place to negotiate a deal with the agents of
other users. The agent may propose deals to the other agents and may accept
deals proposed by them. It determines the value of any such deal based on the
terms of the contracts involved in it as well as on the reputations of the issuers
of those contracts. Once several agents agree on a deal the users themselves will
also be asked if they agree with that deal. If not, they can still reject it.
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